About a dilemma in the telecommunications sector: Virtual operators or low-cost operators? by Lefebvre, Olivier
Periodicals of Engineering and Natural Sciences   ISSN 2303-4521 
Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2019, pp.504-513 
Available online at: http://pen.ius.edu.ba 
 
 504 
About a Dilemma in the Telecommunications Sector: Virtual 
Operators or Low-cost Operators? 
 
Olivier Lefebvre
1 
 
1Olivier Lefebvre, Consultant, Paris, France. 
 
 
 
 
 
Article info 
 Received April 30 th 2019 
 
Keywords 
Bertrand competition 
Bertrand paradox 
Differentiated products 
Saturated markets 
Virtual operator 
Corresponding author 
Olivier Lefebvre 
Olivier Lefebvre Consultant 
4 rue Rollin 75005 Paris France 
E-mail : o.lefebvreparis05@orange.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In many countries there are Mobile Virtual Network Operators. They have no network [1]. They buy 
traffic from operators with a network [2]. But there are also Low-Cost Operators: they are branches of 
operators selling the standard service, as virtual operators, while the operator itself sells the 
sophisticated service. The topic which is dealt with in this paper is the coexistence of virtual operators 
and low-cost operators.  
Virtual operators are fragile, if they have low cost operators as competitors. The reason is the 
following: in case of price war, a virtual operator loses its customers and goes bankrupt. At the 
opposite, a low cost operator can decrease its price without unbearable loss, because: (1) its cost is less 
than the virtual operator, and (2) when it decreases its price, it loses less profit, because it cannibalizes 
the customers of the operator itself (when the operator loses a customer who is recovered by the low 
cost operator, it makes less profit, but its profit is not reduced to 0).    
ABSTRACT. A virtual operator is fragile when it is in 
competition with other virtual operators. This is explained by the 
“Bertrand paradox”: when firms sell products not differentiated (or 
not enough differentiated) a price war has terrible consequences 
(the profits tend to zero). But it is worse if there is a price war 
between the operators with a network. It occurred in France during 
the period 2012 – 2018. The entrant Free triggered a price war. The 
reaction of the incumbents was to create low-cost operators which 
were their branches.  The only virtual operator with a large size, 
Virgin Mobile, was “bought and closed down” by the incumbent 
SFR. It suffered too much because of the incumbents decreasing 
their prices and the low-cost operators, both. It lost many 
customers. One proposes a model to explain why the “buy and 
close down” of Virgin Mobile was profitable (and chosen) in these 
conditions. The method used is Bertrand competition.  
Also, the “buy and close down” which is profitable is a criterium 
for products which are not enough differentiated. A few examples 
are given. 
The aims of the paper are two: 
- To study how works a price war in telecommunications. 
- More generally, the possibility of profitable “buy and 
close down” allows to propose a criterium for saturated 
markets. Even, the criterium could be used to build 
software (to test if a market is saturated or not). The rival 
models which are presented in the literature are 
commented. 
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This allows to understand in a better way the story of the telecommunications sector in France, 
between 2012 and 2018. At the start, there were three mobile operators, Orange, SFR and Bouygues 
Telecom. Then the regulator decided to allow an entry: the entrant was Free. Free triggered a long-
lasting price war to get a market share. It sold the standard service at a low price. It succeeded. The 
incumbents reacted in this way: they created low-cost operators which were their branches. The goal 
was to thwart Free on its terrain: to sell the standard service to customers wanting to make economies. 
The low-cost operators were Sosh for Orange, Red for SFR and B and You for Bouygues Telecom.  
The outcome was a spectacular decrease of prices in France: the average of the amount of the monthly 
invoice decreased from 26 Euros to 16 Euros (it is the average of pre-paid and post-paid). Concerning 
the virtual operators, there were several but one was remarkable, Virgin Mobile [3]. It was very 
innovative: 
- It reached nearly two million of customers 
- It was the first   to offer very cheap SMSs (Short Messaging System) 
- It was the first to offer “SIM1 only” formulas (purchase without obligation, no terminal provided, 
only the SIM card is provided) 
- It was the first to offer unlimited calls 
- It was the first to offer “quadruple play” (telephone, television and Internet thanks to a “box” and 
mobile telephony). 
It became a “full MVNO”. That is to say, it owned some segments of networks, was able to buy 
traffic from several sellers (it is useful to lower the cost of the traffic which is purchased). It sold its 
own SIM cards. It owned a brand. Even, it owned a few stores. 
But the price war triggered loss of customers. Because of the competition with the low-cost operators, 
its profit decreased. Finally, Virgin Mobile was owned by an incumbent, its host operator SFR
2
. Later 
the brand Virgin Mobile disappeared and the customers were transferred to Red and SFR.  
It seems that there are two kinds of situations: 
- Either the prices decrease because of virtual operators which have a large size, are stable, have a 
brand and become “full MVNOs”. It is the case of Germany, Denmark, Netherlands … 
- Either the prices decrease because of a price war. Low-cost operators are created. The main 
virtual operators are purchased. It is the case of France. 
What is interesting in the story of the purchase of Virgin Mobile by SFR is that it was closed down.     
It is what we call “buy and close down”: an asset is bought then closed down. In general, the asset 
which is bought is used: it is a “buy and manage”.  In this paper one explains the profitability of “buy 
and close down”, which exists sometimes, by game theory and the “Bertrand paradox”. When the 
utilities of the consumers have nearly the same values, concerning several products, it is easy to catch 
all the market by decreasing one’s own price. Finally, the prices are very low and this explains that 
the “buy and close down” can be profitable. 
In this paper there are two parts: 
- In the first part one studies the “Bertrand paradox” and the reasons why the “buy and close down” 
can be profitable. The method comes from game theory: it is Bertrand competition. This method 
is described by Jean Tirole [4]. However, one uses this tool from game theory in a particular way: 
(1) one deduces the demand from the consumers’ utilities. Details on this method are given in the 
book written by the author of this article “Game theory and the stakes in the telecommunications 
industry” [5], and (2) more than two players are considered (indeed, three). Examples of “buy and 
close down” are presented. One can present examples which are tractable.    
- In the second part one models a telecommunications sector with two competitors (operators with 
networks) and virtual operators and low-cost operators. One demonstrates that to “buy and close 
down” a virtual operator is profitable. Indeed, it is profitable when one passes from Nash 
equilibrium to another Nash equilibrium, or when there is a price war. In France, there was a 
price war when Virgin Mobile was “bought and closed down”.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 SIM : Subscriber Identity Module. 
2
 Indeed, Virgin Mobile was bought by Numericable, a cable operator. Then Numericable bought SFR. At this 
time SFR owned Virgin Mobile.
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2. Materials and methods. 
We give details on the Bertrand paradox and particular cases. Also, an example is the competition 
between a virtual operator and a low-cost operator. 
In the Bertrand paradox two firms E1 and E2 sell two different products. They choose their prices. But 
the products are not differentiated. That is to say, for any consumer the utility of the product of E1, u1 
is equal to the utility of the product of E2, u2. If u1 = u2 all the density is on the bisector (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: in the Bertrand paradox all the density of the utilities is on the bisector. 
 
It is easy to demonstrate that at the equilibrium every firm makes no profit. The Nash equilibrium 
corresponds to p1 = p2 = 0, P1 = P2 = 0. For reasons of symmetry the equilibrium price is p1 = p2 = p0.  
If p0 > 0, one of the firms can choose p0 - ԑ (ԑ > 0 and small) and catch D (p0) / 2. Its profit increases. 
Therefore, the only value possible for p0 is 0. 
Now, if E1 buys E2 and closes down it, it makes the monopoly profit Pm, Pm > 0. Therefore, the “buy 
and close down” is profitable. Before the purchase the profit of E1 was 0 and the profit of E2, 0. The 
profit of E1 Pm is more than 0 + 0 = 0 and the operation is profitable. E1 can pay for an amount ԑ’ (ԑ’ > 
0 and small) to buy E2 and makes a gain since Pm - ԑ’ > 0. It could also keep E2 and the outcome would 
be the same. In this case the outcome of “buy and close down” and “buy and manage” is the same.   
In general, when there are two players, the “buy and manage” allows more gain than the “buy and 
close down”. The argument is that of the replication of the choice: when the buyer manages the asset 
he bought, he can replicate the choice of “buy and close down” (which corresponds to p2 maximal and 
p1 allowing the maximal profit, p2 being given). Then he maximizes his profit. Therefore, in practice, 
one cannot see a “buy and close down” when there are two firms.  
What are the examples of “buy and close down” which are chosen, because they are profitable (and 
more profitable than “buy and manage”)? 
Indeed, they are rare and discreetly conducted by managers, because to destroy an asset (machines, 
brand etc.) is scandalous. A famous example is the Brazilian coffee burnt in the locomotives at the 
time of the Great Depression.  Another example is the Garot law recently voted in France, imposing to 
the supermarkets to give their unsold food to associations, instead of destroying it. The associations 
distribute the food to poor people who in any case would not have bought the food (therefore the 
supermarkets do not lose any demand). It shows that destruction of goods is scandalous. However, one 
can quote a recent example in France. In 2017, in Docelles, a village, the firm UPM (United Paper 
Mills), a paper producer, closed a plant. At this time, members of the staff during a night, destroyed 
the machines used to produce papers (big cylinders)3. So they could not be sold to competitors who 
would have used them. It raised a scandal [6]. However, in this paper one postulates that the managers 
know what they do. UPM has paid for money (the loss which is the consequence of the machines 
which are not sold) to get less competition, when the products are not differentiated enough. In this 
case, the operation is profitable (it is demonstrated thanks to Bertrand paradox). Even, the “buy and 
close down” which is profitable is a criterium for a market with products not enough differentiated.   
                                                          
3
 The managers acted during the night, not because the destruction of the machines was illegal, but because it 
was scandalous.  
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To know if a “buy and close down” is profitable, one compares two states. First, there is Nash 
equilibrium with n players. If E1 is the purchaser and E2 the purchased, their profits are P1 and P2. 
After the purchase, E2 is closed down, there is a Nash equilibrium with n - 1 players. The profit of E1 
is P’1. The “buy and close down” is profitable if P’1 > P1 + P2. If E1 keeps E2, there is also a Nash 
equilibrium with n – 1 players, but E1 maximizes the sum of the profits of E1 and E2 (given the choices 
of the competitors). Suppose its profit is P’’1.  The “buy and manage” is profitable if P”1 > P1 + P2. 
When there are two players the “buy and manage” is always profitable and more profitable than the 
“buy and close down”. When there are at least three players there are two cases: 
- The “buy and manage” is more profitable than the “buy and close down”. If the “buy and 
manage” is profitable it should be chosen.  
- The “buy and close down” is more profitable than the “buy and manage”. If the “buy and close 
down” is profitable, it should be chosen. It is the only example of “buy and close down” which 
can be observed in the reality (the case of UPM at Docelles). 
Indeed, in the case of Virgin Mobile and UPM at Docelles, it was not a “buy and close down”, but a 
“close down” since the firms already owned the assets (their branches). The “close down” was 
preferred to demerging (and to keep the asset).  
But the “close down” depends on the same conditions than the “buy and close down”. And the “keep 
and manage” depends on the same conditions than the “buy and manage”. We shall return on this topic 
in the following chapter. 
Now we describe a tractable example of “buy and close down” which is profitable. 
 In this example the density of utilities is distributed homogeneously on the bisector in the plane 
u3 = 1 / 2 (Fig. 2). 
The Bertrand paradox applies. At the Nash equilibrium with three players, p1 = p2 = 0, P1= P2= O,  
p3 = 1 / 4, P3 = 1 / 16. Now one supposes that E3 buys E2 for a price equal to ԑ (ԑ > 0, small). First, the 
“buy and close down” is profitable. At the new equilibrium, p1 = p3 = 1 / 2, P1 = P3 = 1 / 4. The “buy 
and close down” is profitable: 1 / 4 > 1 / 16 + 0 = 1 / 16. But also, the “buy and close down” is chosen 
by E3 because it gains more than choosing “buy and manage”. Indeed, the “buy and manage” triggers 
neither gain neither loss. The profit P3 remains 1 / 4. Therefore, E3 should prefer “buy and close 
down”.  
Why “buy and close down” is chosen appears. When E2 is closed the response of E1 is to increase its 
price (because it is as if E1 has chosen the maximal price, and prices are strategic complements). After 
that, E3 increases its price (since prices are strategic complements). Finally, the low prices because of 
products which are not differentiated enough, no more exist.  
One can explain the case of UPM at Docelles. When a branch is closed, there is a competitor less 
(since the machines are not sold, they are destroyed). One of the competitors responds by increasing 
its price, then another does the same thing (because the prices are strategic complements). There are 
no more the low prices because of the products which were not enough differentiated. The profits 
increase.   
 
Figure 2: the density of utility is on the bisector, in the plane u3 = 1/2 
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Now we use the method (Bertrand competition, the demands being deduced from the utilities) to 
model the competition between virtual operators and low-cost operators. 
One supposes two operators with networks E1 and E2 selling sophisticated packages. There is also one 
virtual operator (E1 being the host operator) or there are two (E1 and E2 being the host operators). It is 
simpler to reason on one virtual operator, and the results are the same (under some conditions).  
For every consumer there are three utilities, u1, u2 and u3 corresponding to the services sold by E1, E2 
and to the standard service. The price p3 of the standard service remains fixed. It is a price not too low 
(since a virtual operator has a high cost c + m, c being the cost of the host operator and m the margin 
when it sells traffic) and not too high, to attract customers. If there are two virtual operators there is no 
Nash equilibrium. The Bertrand paradox applies (the two virtual operators sell the same service, the 
standard service). One knows that if it triggers a price war, the two will probably go to bankrupt after 
some time. So, nothing occurs. The price remains p3. 
It is the same reasoning after the entry of a low-cost operator (or two). A low-cost operator can trigger 
a price war against a virtual operator and win but this time the objection is the regulator. Finally, the 
price of the standard service remains the same when there is a virtual operator (or there are two) and 
when there is also a low-cost operator (or there are two).  
One demonstrates that the “buy and close down” is profitable in two cases: (1) one passes from a Nash 
equilibrium (with one virtual operator and one low-cost operator) to a new one (after the “buy and 
close down”) and (2) price war. 
One passes from a Nash equilibrium to another one. 
In a plane O u1 u2 one represents the demand for E1 (and E2). On the figure 3 in the zone hatched 
vertically there are only customers for E1. In the zone hatched horizontally there are customers for E1 
and for the virtual operator (one on two) and the low-cost operator (one on two). This is explained by 
this inequality: u3 ≤ Inf (u1, u2). Indeed, even the lowest evaluation of the sophisticated package by a 
customer is more than the evaluation of the standard service (by the same customer) since the standard 
service is “comprised” in the sophisticated package.  
Now, if the figure 3 represents the Nash equilibrium before the “buy and close down” a small dp1 
triggers dP1 = 0. Customers are lost in a little strip and also some in the zone hatched horizontally, and 
customers in the zone hatched vertically remain, paying a little more money (p1 + dp1). The two 
exactly compensate each other. After the “buy and close down” the loss triggered because of the 
customers lost by E1 and choosing the virtual operator (one on two) and the low-cost operator (one on 
two) is less. It is because a customer choosing the virtual operator before the “buy and close down” 
chooses now the low-cost operator and the profit is more for E1
 
(the margin m plus the profit of the 
virtual operator instead of the margin m). Therefore, dP1 > 0. Concerning E2 a small dp2 triggers dP2 = 
0 (there is no change).  
Or if E2 is host operator for a virtual operator and has a low-cost operator, dP2 > 0 after the “buy and 
close down”. Finally, if one supposes that the prices are strategic complements and that the 
equilibrium is stable, the two prices p1 and p2 increase.  The “buy and close down” is profitable. When 
E1 buys and closes down the virtual operator it hosts, there is a new Nash equilibrium and its profit 
increases.  
The direct effect is neither a gain neither a loss: the price paid for by E1 is compensated by the profit of 
the virtual operator. And the strategic effect is an increase of the profit P1. 
If there are two low-cost operators there are conditions. The operator E1 can retain the customers of the 
virtual operator, if it offers little advantages (like rebates). The direct effect for E1 is neither a gain 
neither a loss. Otherwise the direct effect is a loss and it is not sure that the “buy and close down” is 
profitable. Also, only if it retains its customers choosing the standard service, offering little advantages 
(so they go from the operator itself to the low-cost operator which is its branch), the reasoning on dp1 
> 0 triggering dP1 > 0, holds. The reasoning on dp2 > 0 triggering dP2 > 0 holds. Thus, the “buy and 
close down” is profitable when there are two low-cost operators if E1 retains its customers.  
Price war.  
The model explains why during a price war a virtual operator loses its customers. Suppose that p1 and 
p2 decrease (price war) while p3 is fixed. When there is a dp1 < 0, E1 wins money by catching four 
kinds of customers: (1) those who did not buy any service (2) some customers of E2 (3) customers of 
the virtual operator (4) customers of the low-cost operator. The customers of the kinds (3) and (4) are 
in the zone hatched horizontally. In the cases (1) and (2), E1 wins its margin. In the case (3) it wins 
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money because its margin is more than the margin m of the sale of traffic. In the case (4), it wins 
money because the margin of E1 is more than the margin of the low-cost operator (even if there is a 
price war, the price p3 is low compared to p1). The operator E1 cannibalizes itself, catching customers 
from its branch the low-cost operator. Concerning E2 when there is dp2 < 0, it wins its margin in all the 
cases. But the most interesting is what happens to the virtual operator. It loses its customers because of 
the price war, and loses half of its customers when the low-cost operator is created. Finally, it accepts 
to be purchased at a low price, and this explains that the “buy and close down” is chosen.  
After the “buy and close down” the price p3 remains the same. The “buy and close down” has to be 
approved by the regulator. In general, the condition is that the price will not increase. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The demand D1 is shown. The prices p1, p2, p3 correspond to the points P1, P2 and P’3 and 
P’’3. The axes correspond to u1 (and p1) in abscissas and u2 (and p2) in ordinates. 
 
3. Results and discussion. 
One has shown that when how an asset is managed is considered, the decision tree has not two 
branches (to buy or not to buy, or to sell or not to sell) but three. If the asset is not owned the three 
possible decisions are: no purchase, to buy and manage and to buy and close down. If the asset is 
owned the three possible decisions are: to keep, to demerge and to close down. The decision which is 
taken allows the maximal profit. In this chapter we give more details on this topic and propose the 
criterion “buy and close down is profitable” as a general criterion for markets with too many kinds of 
products. Then we compare with the existing methods (to detect markets saturated by too many kinds 
of products). Also, we apply the criterion to virtual operators and low-cost operators.  
Now we describe the decision tree and its three branches. Suppose the profit of the purchaser E1 is  
P1 (N) and the profit of the purchased E2 is P2 when there is an equilibrium with n players. After the 
“buy and close down” the profit of E1 is P1 (CD). After the “buy and manage” the profit of E1 is P1 
(M). 
Now one examines the three cases: 
The “buy and close down” is chosen. 
There are two conditions:  
 P1(CD)>P1(N)+P2                                                                                                                                 (1)                                                  
meaning that E1 wins more after the “buy and close down” and when it had paid more than P2 to E2 
and  P1 (CD) > P1 (M)                                                                                                                                                            
(2)  meaning that E1 wins more having bought E2 if it closes down it than if it manages it. The close 
down is chosen if the conditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled: (1) means that E1 wins more by the close 
down than by selling the asset and (2) means that the close down gets more than the “keep and 
manage”. 
The “buy and manage” is chosen. 
There are two conditions:  
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P1 (M) > P1 (N) + P2                                                                                                                                             
(3) meaning that E1wins more after the “buy and manage” and when it had paid for a price more than 
P2 to E2 and  
P1 (M) > P1 (CD)                                                                                                                                 (4)  
meaning that E1 wins more after having bought E2 if it manages it than if it closes down it. The “keep 
and manage” is chosen if the conditions (3) and (4) are fulfilled: (3) means that E1 wins more by the 
“keep and manage” than by demerging and (4) means that E1 wins more by the “keep and manage” 
that by the close down.  
No purchase. 
There are two conditions:  
P1 (M) < P1 (N) + P2                                                                                                                              (5) 
meaning that E1 wins less after the “buy and manage” and when it had paid for a price more than P2 to 
E2,  and   
P1 (CD) < P1 (N) + P2                                                                                                                          (6) 
meaning that E1wins less after the “buy and close down” and when it has paid for a price more than P2 
to E2. Therefore, there is no purchase. The demerging is chosen if the conditions (5) and (6) are 
fulfilled: (5) means that E1wins more after the demerging and having got a little than  P2, than if it 
manages the asset,  and (6) means that E1 wins more after the demerging and having got a little than 
P2, than if it closes down the asset. 
The choices can be shown in the Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: the choices are shown. They depend on conditions. The asset can be not bought or already 
owned. 
 The asset is to 
buy 
The asset is already owned 
P1 (CD) > P1 (N) + P2 
And         P1 (CD) > P1 
(M) 
Buy and close 
down 
Close down 
P1 (M) >    P1 (N) + P2 
And 
P1 (M) > P1 (CD) 
 
Buy and 
manage 
Keep and manage 
P1 (CD) < P1 (N) + P2 
And 
P1 (M) < P1 (N) + P2 
 
No purchase Demerging 
 
There are tractable examples in the three cases. 
Buy and close down: the example quoted in the preceding chapter is valid. 
Buy and manage: suppose a cube of length 1 backed to the axis 0 u1 u2 u3. The density is 
homogeneously distributed on the diagonals of the exterior sides. One is (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0). Another is 
(1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1). The last is (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1). The conditions (3) and (4) are fulfilled. 
No purchase: to have an example of the condition (5) is difficult. Indeed, if one makes some general 
hypotheses, the merger is always profitable (in case of Bertrand competition). However, when the 
products are perfectly differentiated, the merger provides no gain. There is neither gain, neither loss. 
If one supposes that the asset is already owned, the example of “buy and close down” is valid for close 
down. The example of buy and manage is valid for keep and manage. The example for no purchase is 
valid for demerging.  
The possibility of “buy and close down” which is profitable suggests to use it as a criterion for markets 
which are saturated with too many kinds of products. One could build up a software to know if 
products are enough differentiated or not. Thanks to market research one coarsely knows the density 
of utilities. Then one chooses a pace π (for instance 0, 1) for the prices p1, p2 and p3 (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1). One 
calculates in every point (p1, p2, p3), D1, D2 and D3, then P1 = p1 D1, P2 = p2 D2 and P3 = p3 D3. One 
determines the Nash equilibrium and the profits P1N, P2N, and P3N. In (p1N, p2N, p3N) the profit Pi does 
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not change if the price pi varies to piN + π or to piN – π. Then the density is projected on the plane O u1 
u2 (E3 is closed down). There is a Nash equilibrium with two players and the profits are P’1N and P’2N. 
If P’1N > P1N + P3N the “buy and close down” is profitable. If P’1N < P1N + P3N the “buy and close 
down” is not profitable. Such a software could be of interest for banks or fintechs.  
One can compare this criterion with those which are in the literature.  
One finds in the literature two rival models, the Hotelling’s model and the Salop’s model: 
The Hotelling’ model. 
When Hotelling published his article presenting the model in the 30s, it attracted attention [7]. It was a 
model on location and transport costs. On a segment (0, 1) of length 1, the firms A and B choose their 
location in x = a and x = 1 – b (1 – a- b < 1). One can suppose than A is on the left and B on the right. 
There is a uniform density of consumers. The transport cost is t f (d) > 0, f increasing, where d is the 
distance of the consumer in x to the firm A (d = │x - a│) or to the firm B (d = │x - b│). But the 
model can also be used to study product differentiation [8]. The net utility of the good sold by A is U – 
p1 – t f (│x - a│) and the net utility of the good sold by B is U – p2 – t f (│x - b│). If A and B are at 
the same point, one finds the Bertrand paradox (p1 = p2 = c, П1 = П2 = 0). So not only the model can be 
used for location theory (New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics c, 2008) but it can be used to study 
the saturation of a market. In the first period of the game, the firms choose location and in the second 
period of the game they choose price. At the Nash equilibrium if the profits are less than the fees for 
entry the market is saturated (the products are not enough differentiated). 
The results of the game can be presented [9]. First the function f cannot be linear: for some values of 
the locations, the Nash equilibrium of the second period game does not exist. Second, d’Aspremont 
and alii have demonstrated that if f is quadratic, Nash equilibrium exists [10]. The two firms locate at 
the ends of the segment (maximal differentiation). Again, if the profits are more than the fees for entry 
the market is not saturated, if they are less, it is saturated (an increase of t, meaning more product 
differentiation, could allow the entry being profitable).  
One can compare the model to the criterium presented in the paper: 
- In the Hotelling’s model, there are only two firms. In the paper, three firms are considered, and 
possibly four, five … 
- In the model the consumers’ tastes have exactly a particular shape (f (d) = t d2). In the paper, the 
utilities have any shape. Market research allows knowing the cloud of utilities. The only 
constraint is that there is a unique Nash equilibrium (the computer finds it if it exists). 
The Salop’s model. 
On a circle of length 1 n firms locate. It is symmetrical [4]. The model allows to calculate the profits at 
the equilibrium. If they are more than the fees for entry the market is not saturated. If they are less, 
there are too many products (or more product differentiation should be allowed by an increase of the 
factor t, the cost being equal to t d). The model is interesting when the tastes of the consumers can be 
represented on a circle: a circular highway, times of departure of a plane, dates of festivities in some 
city during one year …But concerning for instance telecommunications services, there is high or 
standard quality. The criterium presented in the paper requires no condition on the consumers’ tastes. 
Research continues thanks to two approaches: 
The representative consumer approach. 
There is a unique consumer whose utility function U (q) has some mathematical shape (q is a bundle 
of goods). The utility function is maximized by the consumer, given the choices made by the firms 
selling the goods. 
The discrete points approach. 
The points represent the tastes of the consumers. Some mathematical shape is chosen. The Hotelling’s 
model and the Salop’s model are examples of this approach. The criterium presented in the paper is 
also an example of this approach, bur no mathematical shape is supposed.  
Finally, if the sector of telecommunications is concerned, the “buy and close down” which is 
profitable explains what occurs during a price war.   
           
4. Conclusion. 
In conclusion one can make two remarks, on the topic and on the method: 
Remark on the topic. 
One can explain the evolution of the sector of telecommunications in France between 2012 and 2108: 
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- In 2012 there is the entry of Free, triggering a price war. 
- In the following years, the reaction of the incumbents is to create low-cost operators which are 
their branches (Sosh, Red and BandYou). 
- The price war is unbearable for the only virtual operator with a large size, Virgin Mobile. It is 
“bought and closed down”. Indeed, since it was owned by SFR, it has been “closed down”. 
At the opposite, in Germany, Nederland and Denmark, the prices are low because of virtual operators 
with a large size and stable. There is no price war.    
In the paragraph 4 is set out a model with two operators having networks, in competition, a low-cost 
operator and a virtual operator. One demonstrates that the “buy and close down” (the virtual operator 
is “bought and closed down”) is profitable and chosen when there is a price war. It is also profitable 
and chosen when one passes from a Nash equilibrium (between the two operators) and another Nash 
equilibrium.  
The topic is all the more interesting since the same could occur in Italy. Indeed, Free has created an 
operator in this country and has triggered a price war, like in France. Incumbents have created low-
cost operators, Kena Mobile in the case of Telecom Italia, and Ho! Mobile in the case of Vodafone. A 
virtual operator with a large size which is threatened is Lycamobile (which has about 1 million 
customers).  
Remark on the method. 
In general, the “buy and close down” which is profitable is a criterium for products not enough 
differentiated (like in the Bertrand paradox). One can give examples. For instance, consider a cube 
of side 1 backed to the axes, with homogeneous density. The products are enough differentiated: the 
“buy and close down” is not profitable. But if the cube slides along the bisector on a distance 1 / 3 
(translation of vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)) the products are not enough differentiated and the “buy and close 
down” is profitable (fig. 4).  
 
Figure 4: a cube is moved in a translation of vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). The density is homogeneous. 
 
Therefore, a software could be built up allowing to detect the markets with too many kinds of 
products. It could be useful for banks and fintechs.  
One can give an intuitive and qualitative explanation. In case of “buy and close down” there is a 
negative direct effect: the buyer E1 loses the profit P2 of the bought firm E2. Then there is a strong 
strategic effect. As the number of firms is n – 1 and no more n, the profit of each firm increases.  
And concerning E1 the increase of its profit compensates and besides the loss due to the direct effect. 
Therefore, this increase of the profit is large. It proves that the market was saturated with too many 
kinds of products (since once there is a competitor less, the profit of a firm which remains active 
increases very much).  
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